Detour

Security model

Detour treats the storage, the network and every other member's computer as hostile. There is no Detour server to trust or to breach.

What happens if

If Then
your Git host or shared folder leaks the attacker gets ciphertext. Names, addresses, logins, members and who can see what are encrypted.
the storage alters, reorders, hides or rolls back changes others have seen every member's Detour detects it and says so.
a teammate's copy of Detour is modified it still holds only the keys that teammate was given. Access is enforced by encryption, not by the app.
someone is removed from a team the rest of the team moves to new keys. Nothing written afterwards is readable to them.
your laptop is stolen the vault is sealed with your master password and locks itself when idle.
a server's host key changes the connection stops before any password or key is sent.
a Detour ID is swapped on its way to an admin the fingerprints you compare don't match.
someone publishes a fake update the app refuses it: updates must carry the project's signature.
an AI agent goes further than asked it reaches only the hosts and rights you allowed, for the time you chose, never sees a password or key, and can't accept a new server key.
a program in your terminal runs detour it works only in a terminal you trusted, and the master password is never read from a pipe.

How it's built

  • Your vault is encrypted with age: an X25519 identity sealed with your master password through scrypt.
  • Team data is split into per-record parts, each encrypted with ChaCha20-Poly1305 under its own key. Members receive only the keys for what they may see, sealed to their Detour ID.
  • Every change is signed with Ed25519 and chained to the device's previous change. Each change also records how far its author had read every other device, so missing or rolled-back changes show up.
  • SSH is russh, TLS for Git over HTTPS is rustls with your system's certificate store.
  • Updates are signed with the project's key, which is built into the app.
  • The core (the process that holds your unlocked vault) listens only for your user: a named pipe only you can open on Windows, a socket in a folder only you can enter elsewhere. It checks which program is on the other end: the window must be Detour's own, a terminal must be one you trusted, and an AI agent must bring a token you granted. Detour keeps only a hash of each token.
  • AI agents never receive a password, a passphrase or a private key, can't export keys, can't forward ssh-agent, and work only in sessions they opened.
  • No accounts, no telemetry.

What cryptography can't do

Detour doesn't pretend to solve these:

  • Anyone allowed to read something can copy it and pass it on.
  • Connecting with a shared password means having it: "may connect with the shared password" and "may see it" are the same right.
  • Someone removed from a team keeps what they already had. Change the shared passwords and keys they could see.
  • With one storage and no other channel, the storage can show a member a consistent but old state and hold back the newest changes nobody has acknowledged yet. It can't hide what someone has already acknowledged, roll a client back, or show two members different histories without that showing up. Compare the state fingerprint over another channel to be sure.

The full design: docs/teams.md.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please don't open a public issue. Report it privately through GitHub's security advisories. The report stays private until a fixed release is out. What counts as a vulnerability is described in the security policy.